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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah· 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PI,Iintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DEAN PETERSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 7286 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's brief contains a statement of facts and there-
fore respondent refrains from making any independent pre-
sentation of the circumstances except in instances where 
respondent will refer to certain facts in presenting evidence 
and testimony which appellant failed to bring out in his brief. 
Appellant assigned 3 3 assignments of error in his brief and 
organized his argument to cover said errors under four propo-
sitions. With this in mind, counsel for respondent will here-
inafter answer such arguments with the same organization of 
subject matter. 
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.·· :-~-;·.: 
~ !£1 ! (. 
ASSERTION NO. 1 
... ':IJ ,·,·.·· 
THE EVIDENCE OF THE REVOCATION OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S DRIVER'S LICENSE WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED. 
Appellant's contention ~s that there was no competent 
evidence . introduced at the trial to connect the revocation of 
defendant's driver's license with the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the death of James Curwood. A careful ·review 
of the transcript of the testimony taken at the trial reveals 
that there was a definite chain of circumstances which connect 
defendant's driving after revocation of his license with the 
death of James Curwood. Briefly this testimony includes the 
following: 
1. Bert Karen at T. 19 testified as· follows concerning 
the truck which ran over the deceased James Curwood: 
A. wr ell, 1 see a car light coming down the road, but 
I didllt pay 'much attention to that, I just stepped up 
• J far enough so that I would be! nobody would see me, 
:you know, as far as. what I was doing, and the cat· 
·came down and it pulled over on that side of the road , · 
over there to pass me, when I hea1·d a thud or bump, 
and just in split seconds, you know, and by the time 
I got my brain to going and thinking a second,, why 
I said, rrGod, he has hit or run over som-ething." I 
don't know· just exactly what I said but I said some-
think like that. · 
And I broke and run down the road and he was lay-
ing right square in the road. And I leaned right over 
him and put my hand on him like that (indicating). 
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·,. 
And I thought I u•as there quite a little bit, but it might 
have been just seconds, I don't know for sure, but 1 
just leaned over and put my hand on him and I thought 
he might gasp or something, but he just-] said, ''God, 
he is dead." And I looked ttp and there u·as my brother. 
And my brother said, rrDon't touch him. Let's get the 
law." And I was scared and dumfounded and I don-'t 
know U'hat all, and I looked down the road and the 
car was still going. So I broke and ran back to the 
pickup. The thought I had was to get to Harry Au 
1VI.iller' s to the phone and get somebody there that could 
do something and know something about it. And that's 
exactly what I ~id. 
The witness placed this occurrence at about 3:00 o'clock a. m. 
(T.96) 
2. When asked what kind of a vehicle it was he was testi-
fying about, Bert Karen answered that it was "a truck with a 
box on". (T.22) 
3. S. D. Hatch, the State Highway Patrolman, who had 
received a call from Bert Karen, stated that he was told over the 
phone by Mr. Karen "to watch for a large truck coming towards 
Vernal." 
4. Concerning the first vehicle coming toward Vernal sub-
sequent to this warning, S. D. Hatch testified as follows: 
A. The first thing I observed about the car that C"ame_ 
around the turn was that it had clearance lights and 
one weak light; the lefthand light was not -very bright. 
Q. Now when you say lefthand light, which one do 
you mean, lefthand as you were facing it, or what 
would it be? 
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, :·A. It would be the right hand as I was facing it and 
. tf?e lefthand from the re4r of the ,truck. 
.Y Q. W ha~ l!ght do you mean? 
.. 
_, ... ~,·, A. The headlight. 
· .• , · · · Q. And you say-you could see what else on the car? 
~.-,::;·~·(:-~ ' . 
. ,._ ~- · .. 
,_. 
.... ~, ' . 
. . : 
. _ L1·. I could see some clearance lights on the front, 
hi.gher, than_ the headlights and a little wider . 
Q. Was the truck coming towards you? 
_A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then what did you do? 
_ A. At about, oh, midway in the fourth block in Vernal 
Main street ·on U. S. 40 I turned the red light toward 
the approaching truck, jumped out with my flash light 
.,and _waved the truck over to the side of the road. 
Q~ Whom did you find, if anyone, in the truck{ 
A. I found one person only in the truck, the defendant 
Joseph Dean Peterson. (T~ 114-115). 
>. ,). The state highway patrolman's first cursory examination 
ofthe.defendant's truck at this timerevealed that the left front 
fender, the left headlight and the left fog light were bent back 
a_nd ''kin~ of twisted off to the side.'' (T.121) Of course, there 
~ere numerous references to this condition of the truck later on 
in the trial together· with photo~raphs of the same which were 
introduced and admitted at the trial. 
.. _ 6. According to Mr. C. P. Allison, Highway Patrolman 
f~r .the State of Colorado, the headlights on defendant's truck 
we~e normal and- of equal intensity at 11: 30 p.m. in Artesia, 
Colorado. (T.3T7) 
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7. During the course of the conversation between Hatch 
and the defendant at the time of the defendant's first arrival in 
Vernal, the following took place, according to the testimony of 
Mr. Hatch at 128: 
A. T be defendcmt, 11--Ir. Peterson, hollered at me and 
carne acmss the street to the car, and as I recall, as near 
as I recall his u•ords, he asked rne, he said, rrsam, U'dJ 
that man killed out there?'' or something to that 
e_ffect. To which I told him I didn't know for sure. 
He replied, as near as I recall, uHe hadn't better be. 
I hope he is not." 
8. Concerning a later examination of defendant's truck at 
Vernal, in front of the police station, Mr. S. D. Hatch further 
testified as follows: 
A. I observed on the cross members, frame, fear chan-
nel bolts that holds the springs to the rear axel, several 
places along from the driver's door, or the cab of the 
truck, back to the rear end, marks that had been brushed 
clean. There was kind of an oily dustry covering sub-
stance under the truck, covered with dust. This had 
been wiped clean at different angles along the frame 
and some on the cross members, some on the rru·· 
holts or the channel bolts on the fear. (T. 199). 
Thus indicating that the under parts of the truck recently had 
come into contact with some object or person. 
· 9. During the course of this examination of the truck, Pa-
trolman Hatch discovered a tooth resting on top of the front 
axel. (T. 200, 203) 
10. This tooth was later that day identified by Dr. Stevens 
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•as a .tooth from the mouth of the deceased, James Curwood. 
-(T .. a44) 
The ·above evidence certainly tends to connect the defend-
ant with the driving of the vehicle that struck and ran over 
James. Curwood. Though it may be circumstantial evidence, it 
is. equally competent with direct evidence. 31 C.J.S. 907. In 
prosecutions for manslaughter it has been held that it is not 
error to admit in evidence circumstances from which the jury 
may 'infer the responsibility of the defendant for the death, and 
especially where such circumstances are consistent with the 
theory sought to be established by the prosecution. People vs. 
Leutholz ( 1929) 102 Cal. App. 493, 283 P. 292; Heatley vs: 
State ( 1929) 39 Ga. App. 550, 147 S. E. 784; State vs. Flatman 
(1931) 172 La. 620, 135 So. 3. 
" It_ was not until after practically all of the foregoing evi-
dence was in that the State introduced evidence of the revocation 
of defendant's driver's license. Therefore, respondent submits 
'that competent evidence had been offered and received upon 
which the jury could make a finding that the driving of the 
truck in question by the defendant had a causal connection with 
the injuring of Ja_mes Curwood and his subsequent death. 
The principal objection of counsel for appellant, however, 
seems to be that there is no causal connection between the fact 
that the defendant was driving after having had his license re-
voked and the death of James Curwood. 
The lower court in ruling upon the defendant's objection 
to the introduction of evidence of the revocation of defendant's 
license, referred to the decision in State of Utah vs. Lingman, 
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97 Utah 180; 91 Pac. (2d) 457, and the appellant quotes at 
length from that opinion. Appellant contends that the lower 
court misinterpreted the law as set forth in the Lingman case. 
According to that opinion, among the unlawful acts which 
might be used as a basis for involuntary manslaughter, which 
are totally prohibited, are the driving without a license and the 
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The 
opinion states that if such totally prohibited acts are "done 
recklessly or with marked disregard for the safety of others, 
they are done with criminal negligence and if death results will 
sustain a charge of manslaughter under arm (a)." 97 Utah 
p. 200. 
Respondent will admit that there are some unlawful acts, 
the commission of which would have no causal connection with 
an automobile accident resulting in death, such as the driving ot 
an automobile by a person who was not supporting his wife and 
family or such as the carrying of concealed weapons, or the 
driving of an automobile without registration plates. However, 
one case has gone so far as to say that the carrying of liquor 
unlawfully was an act which approximately caused the death of 
the deceased in a manslaughter case. This is People vs. Harris, 
( 1921) 214 Mich. 145, 182 N.W. 673; 16 A. L. R. 910, and 
we quote from the opinion as follows: 
'' * * * The trial court limited consideration of the 
proof that defendant was engaged in unlawful trans-
portation of liquor to the question of whether or not 
his criminal conduct in that particular so affected his 
mind as to stimulate or induce wanton negligence in 
recklessly driving the car as claimed, thereby showing 
its causal connection with the killing. 
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.. ''On that subject the court charged the jury as fol-
lqws: 'I have already charged you that defendant, if 
·found guilty, must be found guilty of gross and culpable 
,;, ·negligence in striking and killing Miss Cusino, and 
· · ·. that such gross and culpable negligence in driving and 
· . managing . his automobile was the proximate cause of 
.. , ·"•tlY,!i~.s (:usino' s death ... Gentlemen of the jury, thert 
· .. · ,'has· been some testimony introduced here in reference 
· · to th'e defendant's automobile containing whisky. That 
testimony was admitted, not for the purpose of proving 
·, the guilt of the defendant on . the charge here made 
.. ~ ;;--.. f&ainst. him,. but was introduced as bearing upon the 
· · . _question of negligence. If the defendant knowingly had 
~· "-'. ,"lln his automobile a quantity of liquor which he was 
transporting from Toledo, Ohio, to Detroit, Michigan, 
. .he would be guilty of a felony under the laws of Michi- . 
. ' :. ,1: gan, and he would also be guilty of an offense under the 
' ·laws of the United States. And while the fact, if you find 
:u it :to bf= a fact, that he had whisky in his automobile is no 
· , .. ; >ev~qenc_e of his guilt, and is not to be considered in 
.. : · ... this light, yet you may consider it as bearing upon his 
~- · negligence. It is the theory of the prosecution that 
• ·j''( · '• the . defendant was violating the statute referred to 
a,..nd transporting liquor illegally, and was hurrying 
: •\ 1·.! _,n, tqrough tl;le county of Monroe with his illegal load of 
· · · ... ·:· liquor. This theory of the prosecution must also be 
· · proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt before 
.1:, the jury can consider the carrying of the liquor as 
having had anything to do ·with the accident. In any 
event, and even though the defendant w'as knowingly 
; .. carrying the liquor, he must be found to have driven 
, , . 1: :his machine at the place of the accident with gross and 
· .. culpable neglect, and that the accident occurred from 
. such gross and cupa~le neglect.' 
"Under the circumstances of this case proof that 
defendant was engaged in perpetrating a criminal act 
with the very agency by which he caused the accidental 
death was competent for the purpose to which the 
10 
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court carefully limited it in a very plain and fair charge, 
fully protecting the rights of the accused. 
"The conviction and judgment of sentence will 
stand affirmed." 
This cited case demonstrates that there are unlawful acts which, 
though they may seem to be far afield, do have some causal 
connection with the death of the victim. 
There is evidence in this case that the defendant was ar-
rested for driving while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor on June 8, 1947, and that his license, as a result, was sub-
sequently revoked. The law provides that it shall be unlawful 
for anyone to drive a vehicle on the public highways while his 
license is revoked. 57-4-32 Utah Code Annotated 1943. Section 
57-4-24 id. provides that one year after revocation an applicant 
may apply for a new license, but that the department shall not 
grant it until after an investigation of the character, abilities 
and habits of the driver indicates that it is safe for him to drive 
on the highways. It is plain that the legislature felt that for at 
least a year after revocation, a driver is not safe on the highways, 
at least, there would be a presumption to that effect. Therefore, 
to drive on the highway within that year is prima facie unsafe, 
reckless and in marked disregard for the safety of others. Surely 
there is no question but what unsafe driving has a causal con-
nection to an accident occurring as a result of that driving. 
Driving after having had one's license revoked then, so far as 
this argument is concerned, is not comparable to the driving of 
a person who is not supporting his wife and family or who is 
carrying concealed weapons or who is driving without registra-
11 
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tion plates. Respondent contends that such an act is not only 
malum prohibitum but is also malum in se, just as is driving 
· while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. And, under 
the decision of the Lingman case, it is not necessary that reck-
lessness or a marked disregard for the safety of others be shown. 
Acts which are malum in se might be said to be in and of them-
selves reckless and in marked disregard for the safety of others. 
Feeling that t~ere is no particular difference between civil 
and criminal cases on this question, respondent cites the case of 
Parks vs. :Pere Marquette Ry. Co (1946) 23 N.W. (2d) 196; 
315 Mich. 38, in which case the deceased was killed in his own 
automobile by a collision with the defendant's train. The de-
cedent's friend who was driving, had no operator's license. In 
a suit by the administrator against the defendant railroad, the 
lower court found against the administrator because of the 
contrib~tory negligence of the driver. The appellate court up-
held the trial court in refusing to instruct the jury that the fact 
· the driver had no license was immaterial. On this point the 
court said: 
"As bearing upon the question of contributory negli-
gence, it was competent to disclose to the jury that the 
driver of decedent's automobile did not have a license 
since an unlicet;tsed driver operating an automobile 
upon the highways of this state does so in direct vio-
lation of the statute. * * * 
"The statute · requiring chauffeurs to be licensed 
was designed to protect the public against incompetent 
operators of cars and the employment of an unlicensed 
chauffeur has, therefore, a bearing upon the exercise 
of care which the defendant owed toward the plaintiH 
in the operation of its car * * * * 
"It is not an immaterial question like the failure to 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
have a car licensed, which can have no possible bearing 
upon the operation of the car. The violation of the 
ordinance, therefore, is prima facie evidence of the 
negligence to be submitted to the jury in connection 
with the other facts in the case to determine the ulti-
mate liability * * * * ." 
Respondent submits that we have here a much stronger case 
than that of the driving without a license. In the case at bar 
the driver's license had been revoked for the reason that he was 
not a safe driver. Nevertheless he drove his truck against the 
compunction of the law, which makes it a misdemeanor for so 
doing. Respondent has no quarrel with appellant on the neces-
sity of instructing the jury pertaining to proximate cause. But 
respondent takes the position that such requirement does not 
prohibit the introduction of evidence pertaining to facts and 
circumstances which might be found to have some causal (On-
nection with the ultimate result. Appellant cited several cases 
in his brief as illustrative of the rule that an unlawful act to be 
the basis of the crime of involuntary manslaughter must be the 
direct and proxfmate cause of the death of the deceased. It is 
interesting to note that in none of these cases is the decision 
based upon the improper admission of any incompetent evidence 
pertaining to unlawful acts charged as the basis of the crime of 
. involuntary manslaughter. Most of them pertain to the ques-
tion of whether or not the Judges' instructions were correct. 
ASSERTION NO. 2 
THE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE ON 
THE I~SUE OF DEFENDANT'S INTOXICATED CONDI-
TION AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED CRIME. 
The prohibition against driving while under the influence 
13 
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of intoxicating liquor is for the purpose of making our highways 
safe. In fact the Legislature says that it is not safe to drive 
while in such condition. Anyone who does so, therefore, drive 
in marked disregard for the safety of others. This court has 
recently passed upon the question of whether or not causal con-
nection must be directly shown in cases of involuntary man-
slaughter as· the result of intoxication. State vs. Busby, 102 
Utah 416, 131 Pac. 2d 510. The facts of that case are very 
similar to this case. There the deceased, a pedestrian, was 
struck at a crossing in Salt Lake City. A witness testified that 
he saw the defendant driving the car which struck the deceased, 
that he took the license number, followed the car, drove up 
alongside, called to the defendant and told him he had hit a 
man; whereupon the defenda~t grunted and drove on. There 
was considerable evidence of the defendant's having been drink-
ing prior to the accident as well as to his intoxicated condition 
subsequent thereto. The defendant in attempt~ng to avoid re-
sponsibility for the death of the deceased, set up an alibi as his 
defense. In affirming a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, 
the court uses the following language: 
"Defendant contends ( 1) That the court erred in 
admiting in evidence testimony of defendant's intoxi-
. cated condition forty-five minutes after the accident 
and ( 2) .: that whether such testimony is admitted or 
not there is no evidence that the defendant was intoxi- ' 
cated at the tim·e of the accident and · ( 3) that even 
though there was such evidence and such is criminal 
negligence within the tests laid down by State v. Ling-
man, 97 Utah 180, 91 P 2d 457, there is no evidence 
that such criminal negligence caused the accident. 
"As to the first proposition, defendant testified that 
14 
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during the afternoon he had b~en drinking beer; that 
he had his last beer about 8 o'clock, aq.d dran~ :nothing 
after that time. The court admitted evidence· that at 
9:15 p.m., and for some hours thereafter defendant 
was drunk. The accident occurred at 8:30p.m., a half 
hour after his last drink. On the record the ·admission 
of the evidence cannot be error. Where a man has been 
drinking off and on from 3 to 8 p.m., and is drunk at 
9:15 p.m., the jury might, in the light of the evidence 
of his conduct currently with the accident, well con-
sider those facts and find therefrom that at 8: 30 the 
liquor had so far taken effect that the drinker was so 
under its influence as to be impaired in· his faculties 
and reactions. In this case, the. defendant's .apparent 
unawareness that he hit a man and his unintelligible 
answer when his attention was called to it within a few 
moments after the accident, viewed in the light of the 
testimony that he had been drinking before the accident, 
are all circumstances from which the jury could con-
clude that he was intxoicated to the extent that his 
faculties for keeping a lookout and for control were 
appreciably impaired. 
"There was sufficient basis in fact for the inference 
that Busby was in an intoxicated condition a't rhe time 
he struck the decedent; there is not qnly a sufficient 
basis for the inference that he was so intoxicated that 
the control of his car was appreciably affected by it 
but a basis for the inference that he was so drunk that 
he did not know that he had struck the decedent or, 
knowing it, he had endeavored to escape by leaving the 
scene of the accident. If the jury accepted the latter, it 
would find a guilty knowledge which would itself be 
the basis for a conclusion, in connection with evidence 
that defendant was criminally negligent, that such 
negligence caused the accident. If the jury concluded 
that the defendant was in such condition that he dicl 
not know he had hit the decedent it is contended that 
15 
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the accident might nevertheless have been caused solely 
by the negligence of the decedent. Even if. the decedent 
was guilty of contributory negligence, if the defendant 
was guilty of criminal negligence as defined in the 
case of State v. Lingman, supra, and such negligence 
caused or contributed to the death, the fact that the 
decedent himself may have been guilty of negligence 
which also contributed, would not excuse the defendant. 
The evidence is sufficient to justify a conclusion of 
criminal negligence as defined in the case of State v. 
Lingman, supra. This being the case the jury was 
in the position of having to be satisfied that the negli-
gence of the defendant contributed to the accident. No 
witness saw just how the accident happened. The 
witnesses in the car which followed Busby saw the 
decedent's hat fly off and later the body drop to the 
pavement but did not see the actual impact between 
the car and the decedent's body nor the conduct of 
the decedent immediately before the impact. The 
evidence was sufficient for the inference that the front 
of defendant's car struck the deceased. The glasses, 
presumably those of the decedent, were found on the 
crosswalk; hence the jury could have placed the deced-
dent on the crosswalk when he was struck. There is 
a duty on the part of the driver to keep a lookout 
for pedestrians on the crosswalk even though such 
driver may have a green light. State v. Adamson, Utah, 
125 P. 2d 429. There is a presumption of fact which 
is already a part of our common law, that a person 
acts for his own safety. To repeat: THE JURY 
COULD INFER FROM THE EVIDENCE THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF LIQUOR AT THE TIME OF THE IMPACT. IT 
COULD FURTHER INFER PROM HIS CONDUCT 
THAT HE l¥7 AS SO BADLY UNDER THE INFLU-
ENCE OF LIQUOR THAT DRIVING IN THAT 
CONDITION-----WAS ITSELF A LACK OF DUE 
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REGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OtHERS AND 
THAT HE W41S, THEREFORE, GUILTY OF CR/11'1-
INAL NEGLIGENCE. So it could conclude from the 
presumption that a man acts 1 for his own safety, that 
the decedent did not step or jump in front of the car. 
This presumption should at least serve the purpose of 
warding off the effect of a legal situation in which a 
conjecture that the cause of the accident was the negli-
gence of decedent, is equally balanced with a conjecture 
that such negligence, if it existed, was not a cause 
of the accident if indeed under the circumstances of 
this case we can say that without such presumption 
the mind could be in equipoise in that manner. Thm 
the presumption that a man acts with regard to his own 
safety having performed the office of negating the con-
jecture that the decedent himself was the cause of the 
accident, the only other deduction is that it was caused 
by the defendant AND IF CAUSED THROUGH HIS 
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE U7HlCH AS WE HAVE 
SEEN COULD BE INFERRED, the jury could find him 
guilty. If a man so blind as· not to be ~ble to sec 
pedestrians on the croswalk kills one, are we Jo say 
that the jury cannot infer that defendant's condition 
was the cause of the accident because the jury ·would 
have to speculate that the deceased may have negligently 
stepped in front of the car? The above conclusion 
follows from a finding that the defendant failed to see 
the pedestrian and was unaware that he had. hit him, 
a fact situation from which, with the evidence of drink-
ing and intoxication, it could be inferred that defendant 
drove with a marked disregard for the safety of others. 
"If, on the other hand, the jury concluded tha-t de-
fendant did see the deceased but that he failed to stop 
and pick him up, it could infer from that a guilty 
knowledge that his own negligence had caused· the 
accident. It is contended that his going on if he knev.' 
he had hit the deceased is equally compatibhi \vith ·a 
17 
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feeling of fright even though he knew he had not 
caused the accident. But every reasonable hypothcs._ 
consistent with innocence does not require that we con-
strue a man's illegal act of fleeing from the scene of the 
accident as a neutral factor in disclosing his guilty 
knowledge or the absence of it. People v. Newland, 
15 Cal. 2d 678, 104 P 2d 778; People v. Robinson, 49 
Cal. App. 2d 5 76, 122 P 2d 77. Public policy demands 
that a proper balance be struck between the protection 
which the law throws about an accused and the pro-
tection which the law attempts to afford society from 
the results of criminal conduct. WE THINK A BASIS 
WAS LAID IN THE EVIDENCE FOR AN INFER-
ENCE ON THE PART OF THE JURY THAT NOT 
ONLY WAS BUSBY CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT 
IN DRIVING HIS CAR WHILE UNDER THE 
TELLING INFLUENCE OF LIQUOR BUT THAT 
SUCH NEGLIGENCE AT LEAST CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE ACCIDENT AS TO JUSTIFY A VERDICT 
OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. The 
judgment as affirmed." 
It is submitted that we have very nearly the same situation in 
this case and that there was no error in admitting evidence of 
the defendant's intoxicated condition. 
In the case of State vs. Palmer ( 1929) 147 S. E. 817; 197 
N. C. 135; the court in holding that there had been no error on 
the part of the lower court in refusing to dismiss the involuntary 
manslaughter charge against the defendant who was driving 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, as well as vio-
lating other traffic laws, discusses the rule that responsibility for 
the death depends upon whether or not the unlawful act is 
malum in se or malum prohibitum. We quote from the court's 
opinion: 
18 
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"It is, however, practically agreed, without regard 
to this distinction, that if the act is a violation of a 
statute intended and designed to prevent injury to the 
person, and is in itself dangerous and death ensues, the 
person violating the statute is guilty of manslaughter 
at least, and under some circumstances, of murder." 
In a case singularly similar to the case at bar because parts 
of two teeth from decedent's mouth were discovered between 
the hood and fender of the defendant's automobile, the court in 
its opinion supports the theory that driving while_ tmder the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor is culpable negligence. It is the 
case of State vs. Kline, ( 1926) 168 Minn. 263, 209 N.W. 881. 
The following is a quotation from the court's opinion: 
"The first contention is that the evidence does nor 
support the conviction. It is said the state- produced no 
eyewitness of the tragedy; no one who saw how defend-
ant was driving at the moment of the impact; negligence 
is never presumed; this may have been an unavoidable 
accident; or may have been due to the negligence of 
Stodola; and it was for the state to negative accidental 
injury and negligence of the victim. These contentions 
are fallacious. The state had no greater burden than 
to prove beyond· a reasonable doubt that defendant 
was culpably negligent in driving his automobile against 
Stodola so as to cause his death. When that is done 
any other cause of the homicide is negatived. Negli-
gence of the victim would not be a defense.. State v. 
Peterson, 153 Minn. 310, 190 N. W. 345. We do 
not mean to hold that, if the defense to the homicide 
was unavoidable accident, negligence of the victim 
might not be shown. But no such issue or defense was . 
raised by the evidence. There can be no doubt of the 
sufficiency of the proof. Defendant was drunk. The 
law makes it a . crime for a person in that condition 
to drive a car. The law also makes it the duty of the 
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driver of a car at night to have it lit so that objec .. s 
in front upon the highway may be seen, and dehncj 
how pedestrians should be warned and safeguarded. 
Defendant either was so drunk that he could not see; 
or, if he saw, had not the ability to give warnmg 01 
to avoid striking Stodola. There is evidence uor1; 
which the jury could find that Stodola was walk111L_: 
west, north of the center line of the road, as defendarh 
was coming east, driving south of the center line, anJ 
that within a few feet of Stodola defendant swerved 
abruptly to the north of the center line, striking hi.L. 
down with the front front light and fender of the 
automobile, and dragging him some 20 feet easterly. 
"Next it is asserted that it was error to charge that 
to drive an automobile when intoxicated is a statutory 
offense, and that a violation of that law raises a pre-
sumption of negligence. Of course, as stated in State 
v. Goldstone, 144 Minn. 405, 175 N.W. 892, violation 
of a statutory provision regarding the operation oi 
motor vehicles, such as found in sections 2705-2714, 
G.S. 1923, does not prove the exi'stence of culpable 
negligence within the meaning of section 10078, G.S. 
1923, defining the crime for which defendant was tried 
But a violation of a statute intended for the protection 
of another, which proximately causes or results in 
injury to such other, must be held criminal negligence. 
And surely no one can read this record without comin,r; 
to the conclusion that defendant's intoxication was 
the cause of the reckless manner in which the auto-
mobile was driven over Stodola. * * * 
"Common sense, in the absence of any statute on the 
subject, suggests that for an intoxicated person tn 
undertake to drive an automobile on a much traveled 
highway is gross or culpable negligence. And, if 
such negligence is shown to result in so driving as to 
str~ke down and kill a person traveling in the proper 
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place upon the highway, there should be no difficulty 
in finding t~at the driver's culpable negligence caused 
the homicide." 
The question of whether or not evidence of intoxication 
was properly admitted was raised in Jones vs. Commonwealth, 
(1938) 273 Ky. 444, ~16 S. W. (2d) 984, and at page 987 
of 116 S.W. (2d) the court includes the following in its opinion: 
"Certainly, there was no error in allowing the wit-
ness to tell the jury of his finding the empty jug, which 
·smelled of liquor, in appellant's car. 
As argued by appellee, the matter of drinking is 
necessarily an ingredient of recklessness, and this evi-
dence bore upon the Commonwealth's effort to here 
show that the driver of the car, charged with reckless 
and wanton driving, was at the time intoxicated. 
The evidence submitted was therefore both material 
and substantial as bearing on the question of whether 
or not the drinking induced and brought. about ap-
pellant's charged reckless and wanton driving." 
Also, in the case of People vs. Townsend, (1921) 214 
Mich. 267, 183 N. W. 177, 16 A. L. R. 902, the court held 
that it was not necessary to set out in the information the 
specific acts which immediately brought about the death of the 
deceased because the act of driving while intoxicated was 
malum in se. \Y/ e quote from the court's opinion on page 
905 of 16 A. L. R.: 
"Voluntary intoxication is an offense not only malum 
prohibitum, but malum in se., condemned as wrong 
in and of itself by very sense of common decency and 
good morals from the time that Noah in his drunken-
ness brought shame to his sons so that they backed 
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in to cover his nakedness, and Lot's daughters employed 
it for incestuous purposes. Drunkenness was declared 
wrong in and of itself, and punishment provided by 
the Israelites; by the ancient Chinese in an imperial 
edict about the year 1120 B. C., called "The Announce-
ment About Drunkenness;'' in ancient India by the 
ordinances of Manu. In Rome the censors turned 
drunken members out of the Senate and branded them 
with infamy. In England 300 years ago drunkenness 
was pilloried as the root and foundation of many sins, 
such as bloodshed, stabbing, murder, swearing, and 
such like, by the statute, 4 Jac. I. chap. 5, and the Ec-
clesiastical judges and officers were granted power tc 
~ensure and punish offenders, and Bacon, in his Abridg-
ment of the Common Law, lists drunkenness as one 
of the sins of heresy. In- Massachusetts Bay Colony in 
1633-34 one Robte Coles, for drunkenness, was dis-
franchised and sentenced to wear a red letter D upon 
a white background for a year. One of the acts passed 
at the first session of the General Assembly of the 
Northwest Territory and approved December 2, 1779, 
provided a penalty for being drunk in a public high-
way. Our statute Comp. Laws 1915 Sec 7774, declares 
drunkards to be disorderly persons, . and Sec. 15 5 30 
makes it an offense for any person to be drunk or in-
toxicated in any street or highway. 
"Voluntary drunkenness in a public place was always 
a misdemeanor at common law; and it was always 
wrong morally and legally. It is malum in se. State 
v. Brown, 38 Kan. 390, 16 Pac. 259, 8 Am. Crim. Rep. 
165. 
"It is gross and culpable negligence for a drunken 
man to guide and operate an automobile upon a public 
highway, and one doing so and occasioning injuries 
to another, causing death, is guilty of manslaughter. 
It was unlawful for defendant to operate his auto-
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mobile upon the public highway while he was intoxi-
cated; made unlawful by statute, and wrongin and of 
itself, and it was criminal carelessness to do so, and 
he is guilty of manslaughter, provided the death 01 
Agnes Thorne was a proximate result of his unlawful 
ct ***" . a . . 
j\mong other involuntary manslaughter cases relegating 
the question of proximate cause as unimportant wherethe driver 
of the automobile is under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
is the case of Keller vs. State ( 1927} 155 Ten~. 633;·:299 S. W. 
803;.59 A. L. R. 685, which was cited by the appellant in his 
brief. The plaintiff in error was charged with driving an auto-
mobile while under the influence of an intox:icant apd running 
over the deceased thereupon causing his death. There was a 
verdict of involuntary manslaughter and the plaintiff in error 
appealed, raising the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, 
and more particularly' whether or not his intoxicated condition 
was a cause or occasion of the decedent's death. In affirming 
the conviction, the court said: 
"We are of opinion that the. driving of · a:n . auto-
mobile upon the public highways of the state by one 
'who is under the influence of an intoxicant,' as the 
quoted words are interpreted in Bostwick v. State~ 
supra, is an unlawful act malum in se. ·. An automo~ile 
in the hands of a sober and skillful driver upon the· 
highway, operated according to law, is an instru-
mentality fraught with danger to others, and ·careful 
handling of such an instrumentality is essential to th~ 
public safety. It is highly criminal and perilous to 
life and property for those under the influence of an 
intoxicant to such an extent 'as to deprive them of their 
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sense of discretion,' to undertake to run such a mach.ine 
on the thoroughfares. 
Such being our view of the matter, we think the 
policy of the law forbids an investigation as to probabL 
consequences, when the driver of an automobile 'under 
the influence of an intoxicant,' as heretofore defined 
runs his car over another person and kills him on the 
public highways of the state. There are many things 
that sober man, in the exercise of due care, would d,, 
to avoid such a collision, which would be entirely 
beyond an intoxicated driver. Fatalities are too numer-
ous and conditions too serious to permit speculative 
inquiries in a case like the one before us. 
There is nothing radical or novel in this conclu-
sion. The efficient cause of this accident was the 
bperation of this car by plaintiff in error while under 
the influence of an intoxicant. Matters urged by way 
of defense merely amount to a charge of contributory 
negligence on the part of deceased and the rule of 
contributory negligence does not apply in criminal 
cases. Lauterbach v. State, 132 Tenn. 603, 179 S. 
w. 130." 
See also: Whitman vs. State ( 1929) 97 Fla. 988; 122 So. 
567; People vs. Kelly ( 1925) 70 Cal. App. 519, 234 Pac. 110; 
State vs. Monteith (1933) 53 Ida. 30; 20 Pac. (2d) 1023; State 
vs. Williams (1931) 161 Miss. 406; 137 So. 106; and 99 A. 
L. R. 785, 6 and 7. 
Appellant argues that there is not sufficent evidence to 
establish that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
at the time of the alleged crime. It is submitted that there was 
sufficient evidence to go to the jury on that question and that it 
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was not necessary that the defendant be in a stupefied and 
drunken condition but that it was sufficient ·to show merely 
that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor to any 
extent. Chapman vs. State ( 1930) 40 Ga. App. 725; 151 S. E. 
410, supports this proposition and holds that: 
"It is· not necessary for the state to show that the ac-
cused was drunk; but it is sufficient if .the state show:· 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was under 
the influence of some intoxicant as charged to any ex 
tent whatsoever, whether drunk or not." 
ASSERTION NO. 3 
THE COURT PROPERLY OVERRULED DEFEND-
. ANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION AND 
CORRECTLY _REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO .. , .•. 
RETURN A VERDICT OF NOT GUILTY. 
Appellant's argument as set forth in his Proposition No. 
3, is based upon his premise that the evidence introduced per- . 
taining to the revocation of defendant's driver's license and his 
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was 
incompetent and, therefore, there was not sufficient evidence to 
go to the jury. Upon the argument set forth above in Assertion 
No. 2, Tesponderit submits that the evidence was competent and 
was sufficient to go to the jury. 
ASSERTION NO. 4 
THE:COURT PROPERLY AND CORRECTLY IN-
STRUCTED THE JURY AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF IN-
2'5 
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VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER AND THE LAW PER-
TAINING THERETO. 
We submit that respondent's argument in answer to ap-
pellant's propositions 1 and 2 sufficiently establishes that the 
court's instructions on driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor and on driving when one's license has been 
revoked, were correct. Appellant admits at page 62 of his brief 
that Instructions 8 and 10 included the necessary "proximate 
cause" requirement. 
In using the word "or" in place of the word "and" in the 
instructions pertaining to driving recklessly or in marked dis-
regard for the safety of deceased, the court was absolutely 
proper, for that is the law. The very much cited Lingman case 
uses the same words in setting forth the law pertaining to crimi-
nal negligence and, as a matter of fact, that portion of the 
Lingman ·opinion quoted by the appellant in his brief, contains 
the definition of criminal negligence three times, and in all 
three definitions the word "or" is used. See appellant's brief 
page 50, line 24, page 53, line 4 and page 55, line 25. 
Appellant contends that Instruction N_o. 15 was ambiguous 
and misleading insofar as it refers to the defendant's running 
into or against the deceased without qualifying such act as 
being done with criminal negligence. It is submitted that such 
does not constitute error for the reason that further on in the 
same Instruction No. 15, and also in Instructions 3 and 4, the 
jury is adequately directed that they must find beyond a reason-
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able doubt, that the defedant ran into or against the deceased in 
a criminally, negligent manner. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the law and authorities pertaining to the. ad-
mission of evidence and the elements of the crime of involuntary 
manslaughter, and a review of the record reveals that the appel-
lant was granted a fair, legal trial; that prejudicial errors did 
not occur; that there was sufficient competent evidence to go to 
the jury and that the jury was properly instructed in accordance 
• with law and justice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
ROBERT S. RICHARDS, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT. 
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